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The growing literature on learning in games has produced various results on the predictive 
success of learning theories. These results, however, were based on various methods of 
comparison. The present paper uses experimental data on a set of four games in order to 
check on the robustness of rankings among learning rules across measures. We characterise 
measures along three dimensions: (i) the scoring rule, (ii) the method of comparison, and 
(iii) the definition of observations and apply all thus defined measures to 12 learning rules. 
The results show that rankings are indeed sensitive to the measure used. Furthermore, we 
point at deficiencies of certain measures that have been applied in the past and suggest the 
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1. Introduction 
In the past literature comparisons of learning rules have often been made without clear state-
ment about what purpose the investigation serves. Many different researchers have applied 
many different measures but rarely cared about the impact of their choice of measure on the 
result. As far as we are aware of, Feltovich (2000) and Erev and Haruvy (2000) are the only 
works that use more than two different measures. This practice neglects the abundance of 
conceivable methods of evaluation. The present work shows that the choice of the method of 
evaluation does very well have an impact on the result of the comparison. Evaluations consist 
of different components. We specify 3 components, namely  
(i)  the measure that implements the comparison between observations and predictions 
(it is equivalent to the scoring rule, if that exists),  
(ii)  the method of comparing observations with predictions and  
(iii)  the way observations are defined.  
For each of these components there are several ways to fill them. The combinations of the ele-
ments of these components result in a large number of alternative methods of evaluation of 
the predictive power of learning rules. We apply all these methods of evaluation to 12 learn-
ing rules and analyse the impact of each component on the ranking of learning rules according 
to their ability to predict experimental data from various games.  
The MSD 
In the past, the measure that has most often been used to compare the success of learning rules 
in predicting experimental data is the mean squared deviation (MSD). This measure sums the 
squared deviations of prediction probabilities from occurred events and normalizes this value 
by finally taking the square root. Selten (1998) has argued in favour of this measure since it is 
the only one that can be generated via a scoring rule that simultaneously fulfils symmetry, 
elongation invariance, incentive compatibility, and neutrality. As noted earlier by Friedman 
(1983) the MSD has also the virtue of being “effective” with respect to the Euclidean metric, 
i.e. the measure produces larger (i.e. less favourable) values as the Euclidean distance b e-
tween prediction and observation increases. The MSD has often been applied to experimental 
data by way of computing the sum of squared deviations between probability vectors and the 
according unit vectors describing the observations made, thereby ignoring the fact that the 
favourable properties apply only to comparisons between probability distributions and prob-
ability distributions. As we will argue in section 6.1 the application of the MSD to dependent   2
realisations of random variables causes several problems, the most important of which is that 
among two learning rules that produce the same expected hit rates, it selects the one that 
makes more probabilistic predictions close to the uniform distribution over states.  
There are several ways out of this problem. Purists would still argue in favour of the MSD, 
with the difference that it should be applied to independent histories of play, i.e. the state to be 
predicted would be the evolution of decisions for the whole of a T-round repeated game. The 
problem with this approach is that even for a small number of players, a small number of al-
ternative strategies, little informational feedback and a moderate number of repetitions of the 
game the number of alternative states (i.e. histories) quickly becomes computationally intrac-
table.  
Component (i) 
The second solution is to use different measures (component i). The mean absolute deviation 
(MAD), for example, does not have the above property, since deviations are treated propor-
tionally. It may, thus, be an attractive alternative. Even more so, since it does fulfil the proper-
ties of the loss functions as derived from Selten’s four axioms for scoring rules. Another way 
of dealing with predictions is to transform the predicted probabilities into point predictions. 
This has been done, for example, by Erev and Roth (1998) by using the proportion of inaccu-
racy (POI). The authors, thereby, deliberately ignored that by reducing probabilities to point 
predictions the probabilistic rules were deprived of their very nature. Furthermore, the trans-
formation cuts off valuable information provided by the learning rules. Another alternative 
measure suffering from the same deficiency is the  Kuipers Score (KS). This measure goes 
back to Pierce (1884) and is nowadays widely used in meteorological literature. However, it 
has the advantage of normalising the value of rules that either predict with uniform distribu-
tion or constantly predict the same action to zero and the value of perfect forecasts to 1 (see 
e.g. Gandin and Murphy 1992). In our analysis we will take all of these measures into ac-
count. We will have a closer look at the comparison between the MSD and the KS in section 
6.2.  
Component (ii) 
A third solution involves a different way of transforming the probabilistic statements into 
point predictions. This is done by looking at component (ii), i.e. by looking at the way predic-
tions are formed and compared to aggregates of the observations. In particular, one may ex-
pand the prediction probabilities to a large set of simulated events whose relative frequencies 
correspond to the predicted probabilities. The comparison would then involve realisations of   3
the predicted probabilities and the actual realisation of the true random variable. Predictions 
and observations would, thus, be put on equal footing without throwing away valuable infor-
mation. This is also addressed in section 6.1, where it is shown that for dichotomous choice 
variables this method of comparison produces the same rankings for the MSD, the MAD, and 
the POI.  
The inconsistency problem of comparing probabilities with realisations of random variables 
can also be overcome by using aggregates of observations over individuals which are com-
pared with aggregates of probabilistic predictions. The resulting method treats learning rules 
as predictors of average play. Whether it is useful to use disaggregated or aggregated data as 
the base is a matter of purpose. Those researchers who are more interested in individual deci-
sion making and the investigation of microeconomic dynamics should prefer using the disag-
gregated data of observations (e.g. Feltovich 2000). Those who are – within a given environ-
ment – interested in the general tendency of decisions over time do better taking averages 
over individuals (e.g. Erev and Roth 1998). Section 6.3 deals with this issue not only at the 
level of probabilities but also by considering the effect of aggregation on the results derived 
from simulated predictions.  
Component (iii) 
A further topic concerns the way observations are recorded and, thus, relates to the way the 
term “observation” is interpreted. We already pointed at the possibility to take aggregates 
over individuals as observations. A different problem arises when dealing with r epeated 
games, i.e. with games that are repeatedly played by the same individuals. Strictly speaking 
the choices of individuals of the same group are not independent, since they receive feedback 
that is correlated with the actions taken by the other players. One way of addressing this 
(without falling back into the purist’s view outlined above) is to take the group outcome of 
one period as one observation (see component iii). Experimenters of public good games and 
coordination games played by cohorts of players started to incorporated this issue long ago. 
However, since the usual learning environment involves a random matching protocol that 
complicates matters a lot, this topic has been neglected in the past literature on learning. We 
will see in section 6.5 that, for our data, this distinction does not have a large impact on rank-
ings between learning rules. However, it is likely that the importance of this aspect rises as the 
number of players that constitute a group increases.    4
One Further Issues 
Apart from the question of how to overcome disadvantageous properties of some methods of 
evaluation we may also address another topic that partly has already been recognised in ear-
lier literature.  
This topic involves the question of whether learning rules are supposed to use all information 
that has been gathered during play until the period for which the action has to be predicted, or 
whether to do predictions for a number of periods beforehand. The two extremes of usage of 
information illustrate that this question, again, is a matter of research purpose. One may use 
all information an agent has collected until period t in order to make a prediction for the 
choice in period t+1. This is called the one-period ahead prediction. These predictions are 
more valuable for short-run investigations of adaptive play and are better suited to elicit the 
cognitive processes of players within a given environment (e.g. Camerer and Ho 1999). The 
other extreme of making predictions is to completely simulate the course of play from the first 
period to the last (e.g. Erev et al. 1999). We call this the complete simulation. The advantage 
of this approach is that it better captures whether a learning rule is able to replicate long-run 
dynamic trends. We incorporated this distinction between types of predictions into our com-
ponent (ii). The difference between these two approaches is being dealt with in section 6.4.  
Related work 
Some brief discussions of the impact of the choice of method of evaluation on the compara-
tive performance of adaptive theories of behaviour can be found in the experimental investi-
gations by Erev and Roth (1998), Camerer and Ho (1999), Feltovich (2000), and Chen and 
Khoroshilov (2000). However, the most closely related work to ours is that of Erev and Ha-
ruvy (2000). They show on a dataset of single-person decision tasks that depending on the 
way the comparison between rules is performed either of three rules may perform best. In par-
ticular, they replicate three differing rankings between three rules by using three methods of 
comparison used in previous literature.  
Our study differs from theirs in three respects. First, Erev and Haruvy also consider the way 
parameter estimations of the respective rules were determined. To the contrary, we simplify 
the comparison by taking estimations as given. Second, the data on which our comparison is 
based were taken from an experiment that’s informational conditions do not allow for the use 
of the experienced weighted attraction learning (EWA) first discussed in Camerer and Ho 
(1999). Third, the scope of our paper is not to replicate a set of diverse former results on   5
learning rules within a single dataset, but to discuss problems and pitfalls associated with the 
choice of method of comparison between dynamic rules.  
Outline 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 to 5 are devoted to thoroughly 
introduce all definitions. Section 2 deals with observations and predictions. Section 3 intro-
duces all elements of the three components, i.e. it presents the notation for aggregates of data, 
the various methods of comparison and the measures. Section 4 describes the experimental 
data set. Section 5 defines all learning rules and reports the parameter estimations. Section 6 
presents the data analysis while section 7 concludes.  
Table 1 gives an overview of all dimensions and levels of comparison.    6
 
Component (i): Measure 
§ mean squared deviation  MSD 
§ mean absolute deviation  MAD 
§ proportion of inaccuracy  POI 
§ Kuipers score  KS 
Component (ii): Method of comparison 
§ measure of actual observations and probabilistic one-period ahead predictions  ( ) P Y M ,  
§ average measure of actual observations and simulated one-period ahead predictions 
   ( ) X Y M ,  
§ average measure of actual observations and completely simulated actions  ( ) Z Y M ,  
§ measure of observations aggregated over individuals or pairs and average of completely 
simulated probabilistic predictions  ( ) P Y M ,  
§ measure of observations aggregated over individuals and average probabilistic one-period 
ahead predictions  ( ) Q Y M ,  
Component (iii): Aggregation level of observations 
§ individual actions  Y 
§ group outcomes  Y
O  
Game 
§ mutual fate control  MFC 
§ fate-control behaviour-control  FCBC 
§ simple coordination  CO 
§ matching pennies  MP 
§ data on all games combined  all 
Rule 
§ Bush-Mosteller  BM 
§ Mookherjee-Sopher  MS 
§ Cross  CR 
§ Börgers-Sarin  BS 
§ Roth-Erev  RE 
§ Variant on RE  REL 
§ Karandikar et al.  KA 
§ Experimentation  EX 
§ Sarin-Vahid  SV 
§ Win-Stay Lose-Change  WSLC 
§ Win-Stay Lose-Randomise  WSLR 
§ Randomisation  RAND 
 
Table 1: Overview of Dimensions and Levels of Comparison   7
2. Notation for observations and predictions 
Individual observations 
We denote the set of players as J and the number of repetitions of the game as T. We assume 
that each player can choose among a set of actions A which is finite, is the same for all play-
ers, and stays fixed over time
1. Elements of all these sets are denoted by the corresponding 
lower-case letters. In each period t of the game player j plays action aj(t) and receives payoff 
pj(t). For later reference we identify the action chosen with the mixed-strategy vector Y(j,t) 
that assigns probability 1 to the observed action, i.e.  
( ) ( ) [ ] a t a a t j Y j = =1 , ,  
whereby 1[.] denotes the indicator function.  
Depending on the kind of feedback given to the players, the individual subjective history is 
given by the vector that subsumes all previous feedback. Since for our exemplary data set it 
will be the case that subjects knew only about which action they themselves had chosen and 
which payoff resulted for themselves, the individual history hj(t) is given by (aj(1), pj(1), …, 
aj(t-1), pj(t-1))
2. Correspondingly, the set of possible histories in period t is denoted by H(t). 
Theories of decision making have produced a multitude of rules that do not directly select ac-
tions but assign probabilities to actions. For this reason we also need to denote the set of 
mixed-strategies on the set of actions, D(A). For each period, a decision rule L maps the indi-
vidual history into the set of mixed-strategies, i.e.  ( ) A t H t L D ﬁ ) ( : ) ( . Because of their adap-
tive nature such decision rules are usually called adaptive rules or learning rules. Note that 
rules that make point predictions are simply mapping into unit-vectors.  
Observations on group outcomes 
In experiments on repeated games the J players are grouped into K groups of I players that 
interact T times with each other. Group  J k ￿  is identified by its members, and the members 
are each assigned a position  I i˛  by the function pos(k,j). Similarly to individual actions we 
refer to the outcome of a group k within period t by the vector Y
O(k,t) that assigns probability 
1 to the outcome actually observed and probability zero to all other A
I-1 possible outcomes, 
i.e. for any  ( )
I
I A a a o ˛ = ,..., 1  
                                                        
1 We may easily generalise to player-specific and time-varying action spaces.  
2 Again we may easily generalise to accustom different informational settings.    8
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Comparisons in previous studies have not always measured the predictive success on single 
observations, but sometimes the predictive success on aggregates, particularly on the average 
choice probability, whereby the average was taken over all individuals. In our notation this 
aggregate observation over all individuals will be denoted as  











, .  
Correspondingly, we will aggregate outcomes over groups and denote the result by  
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Probabilistic one-period ahead predictions 
There are several ways to make predictions. The first and widely applied rule is to use the ac-
tual observations to form the individual history hj(t) for a player j at time t and to make a 
probabilistic prediction  ( ) t j P ,  for this period via the applied learning rule, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( ) t h L t j P j = ,  is the prediction vector that’s elements sum to one. Just as before we may 
also aggregate these one-period ahead predictions over players and get  P . Correspondingly, 
we may make one-period probabilistic predictions f or outcomes of group interactions  P
O 
whereby the histories of all players determine the outcome probabilities of that period. The 
aggregate over groups is then denoted by 
O P . 
Simulated one-period ahead predictions 
An alternative way of using one-period ahead prediction probabilities is to directly carry out 
the so-defined random variables and to use the realisations of the random prediction instead of 
the probabilities. Since some measures will prove not to be linear, measuring the distance be-
tween actual observations and prediction probabilities will make a difference to averaging 
over the identically produced distances between actual observations and simulated prediction 
realisations. We denote the s
th simulated one-period ahead prediction realisation of actions by 
Xs and the according one-period ahead prediction of group outcomes by 
O
s X . 
Completely simulated predictions 
Predictions may be made for more than only one period ahead. The learning rules may be ap-
plied to forecast two, three or maybe more periods beforehand. We chose to use only the two   9
extremes of this predictive ability of the learning rules. Apart from the one-period ahead pre-
diction mentioned above we also examine the predictive power of complete T-round predic-
tions of subjects’ play. We, hence, simulated predictions which are based on the history of 
simulated choices of an individual and not on the actually observed choices. For this purpose 
we need to simulate the complete T-period repeated interaction of all the I group members. 
From a single simulation of choices among group members we may either record the individ-
ual choice probabilities or the actual choices. In case of probabilities the s
th such simulation is 
denoted by  s Q , and in case of the simulated choices we get  s Z . The simulations may also be 
used to produce predictions for group outcomes. And again we may record either outcome 
probabilities 
O
s Q  or the simulated outcomes 
O
s Z . Note that when simulating a complete his-
tory of play, characteristics of the history of subjects are ignored. In order to bear this in mind 
the “bar” in this notation signifies that the corresponding predictions are not indexed by indi-
viduals or groups, just as the average observations Y  and 
O Y  are not indexed by individuals 
or groups. 
3. Measures and Aggregates 
The MSD and aggregates of data and predictions 
In the past literature only few measures for the predictive success of probabilistic learning 
rules have been used. The most prominent is probably the mean squared deviation (MSD; 
also called the quadratic scoring rule) which has first been described by Brier (1950) and has 
extensively been discussed by Selten (1998). In broad terms the MSD is being defined as the 
mean of the squared difference between prediction and observation. However, since for ex-
perimental observations we may use different aggregates of the data and for the learning rules 
we may use different a ggregates of predictions, the MSD measure may be implemented in 
various ways. The most common way of using it (see e.g. Tang 1998, Feltovich 2000, Chen 
and Khoroshilov 2000) is to calculate the mean of the mean squared difference between actu-
ally observed actions and probabilistic one-period ahead predictions. For reasons of normali-
sation one should finally take the square root of the result. With our notation, using individual 
observations Y and individual one-period ahead predictions P, we may write this measure as:  













2 , , , ,
1
) , (  
Note that within this definition the actual observations Y are represented as probability distri-
butions which place all probability on the actually chosen action.    10
Instead of using the probabilistic predictions P we may use the corresponding realisation of 
the implicitly defined random variable X. The complete measure is then defined as the aver-
age of the MSDs between actual observations and the S simulated realisations of predictions
3.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿￿￿










s a t j X a t j Y
JTA S
X Y MSD
1 1 1 1
2 , , , ,
1 1
) , (  
We may not only compare actual observations with one-period ahead predictions but also 
with predictions  Z  which simulate the realised history of a pair in which both players use the 
same learning rule. The resulting measure is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿￿￿










s a t Z a t j Y
JTA S
Z Y MSD
1 1 1 1
2 , , ,
1 1
) , (  
Note that a complete simulation of the history of a pair  s Z  is independent of the characteris-
tics of the actually observed pairs j.  
There have been some arguments as to whether predictions are meant to predict individual 
behaviour or aggregate behaviour. We may apply predictions to different aggregates of data, 
for example aggregates over pairs or aggregates over periods. Similar to using individual ac-
tions we may compare aggregates over individuals Y  with aggregates over completely simu-
lated paths of actions. Erev et al. (1999) have already pursued this approach. However, they 
calculated the average of simulated actions while we use the computationally more efficient 
way of calculating the average of simulated choice probabilities  s Q , i.e.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿
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Finally, one might compare aggregates over individuals with aggregates over one-period 
ahead probabilistic predictions P :  
( ) ( ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿
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) , ( .  
We may calculate the same five measures using outcomes of groups instead of individual ac-
tions. The according measures  ( )
O O O P Y MSD , ,  ( )
O O O X Y MSD , ,  ( )
O O O Z Y MSD , , 
( )
O O O Q Y MSD , ,  ( )
O O O P Y MSD ,  would differ in two ways. First, one would take the average 
                                                        
3 We used S = 10,000.    11
over outcomes o˛O instead of actions a˛A, and second, one would average over groups k˛K 
instead of individuals j˛J.  
MAD, POI and the Kuipers Score 
We further calculate all these measures not only using the MSD but also using the mean abso-
lute deviation, MAD, i.e. instead of using the squared difference between observation and pre-
diction, we take the absolute difference
4, and the proportion of inaccuracy, POI, which has 
already been applied to learning theories by Erev and Roth (1998) and Feltovich (2000). The 
POI measure transforms probabilistic predictions into point predictions by way of treating the 
most probable event as the predicted event. For our dataset this means that if one of the two 
possible actions is predicted with probability higher than 0.5, then  this action is assigned 
probability 1, while the other action is assigned probability 0. In case both actions are pre-
dicted with equal probability (which is typically the case in period 1) then each action is as-
signed probability 0.5. When examining outcomes the POI measure transforms the probability 
distributions over the four possible outcomes into unit vectors that assign all probability to the 
most probable outcome. Ties are again broken by assigning equal probability to all most 
probable outcomes. The  measure then reports the mean number of wrong predictions, 
whereby the mean is taken over all observations. Note that the POI measure requires point 
predictions as well as pure strategy observations. Hence, for comparisons involving aggre-
gates of observations, i.e. Y  or 
O Y , we transform the relative frequencies into pure strategy 
observations by using the threshold of 0.5, just as probabilistic predictions are rendered de-
terministically. The same applies to the next measure.  
Meteorologists usually use a different measure for assessing the predictive power of a dy-
namic theory. The Kuipers score, KS, for two events with base probability of ½ each is de-
fined as the difference between the proportion of correct predictions of an event and the pro-
portion of false predictions when the alternative event occurred. Even though this measure has 
some desirable properties, it lacks applicability to more than two states of the world. For our 
dataset this means that we can apply the KS to the prediction of individual actions, but we are 
unable to specify an appropriate generalisation that allows us to use this measure for the four 
possible group outcomes
5. We define the Kuipers score for observed actions and probabilistic 
predictions as  
                                                        
4 Of course, the normalisation by way of taking the square root has to be dropped.  
5 Gandin and Murphy (1992) show that the KS is the only equitable rule for two-state predictions. They show, 
that equitability imposes necessary constraints on the scoring rule that for predictions on more than two states do 
not suffice to characterize the rule. Thus, we could have generated a scoring rule that shares the equitability   12
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
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where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } 5 . 0 , , # > ￿ = ˛ = b t j P a t a T t j T j ab
6.  
Note that, as are all the other measures, the KS, too, is invariant to a relabeling of actions. For 
probabilistic observations it also fulfils equitability as defined by Gandin and Murphy (1992).  
In the following, when referring to a method of comparison, say the fit of P to Y, without 
specifying the measure we will denote this by the letter M, i.e. M(Y, P) in the above case.  
4. The Data Set and the Games 
The data set is taken from an experiment on behaviour under little information
7. In each of the 
12 sessions 10 subjects were randomly paired to play T = 40 repetitions of a randomly as-
signed 2x2-game, i.e. A = 2 and I = 2. After the first 40-period repetition, subjects were ran-
domly re-matched another three times to pairs to each play another 40 repetitions of another 
randomly assigned game. Each session, thus, provided data on 20 pairs, which totals to k = 
240 pairs over all sessions. Subjects were not informed of what game was actually being 
played. Instead, they were provided a probability distribution over four games from which the 
actual game was randomly drawn. Without further knowledge of the payoff matrix subjects 
repeatedly made decisions on the two available actions (labelled A and B). They knew, how-
ever, that repetitions of the game would end after 40 periods. After each period subjects were 
only told their own payoff and were neither informed of the action chosen by their opponent 
nor of the payoff received by their opponent. The design was chosen such that information 
was minimised to the amount necessary to perform simple adaptation. The four games i n-
volved were mutual fate control (MFC), fate-control behaviour-control (FCBC), the simple 
coordination game (CO), and the matching pennies game (MP). Table 2 displays the accord-
ing payoff matrices of the games:  
At the beginning of each session subjects were told that each of the four games could occur 
with equal probability and that their position as player 1 or player 2 as well as the actual label-
ling of the actions was determined randomly with equal probabilities.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
properties and can be applied to predictions of four states. Since this iterature is not well developed yet, we re-
frain from determining our own generalisation of the KS.  
6 Within the computations, ties in prediction probabilities, i.e. p=0.5 for either strategy, are broken in favour of 
action 1.  
7 More details on the experimental design can be found in Mitropoulos (2001).    13
 
    MFC        FCBC        CO        MP 
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Table 2: The Four Games: Mutual Fate Control (MFC), Fate-Control Behaviour-Control (FCBC),  
Coordination (CO), and Matching Pennies (MP) 
Each game has certain characteristics that may be crucial to the evaluation of the predictive 
power of a learning theory. MFC, for example, is a game in which all mixed-strategy profiles 
are Nash-equilibria. Nevertheless, there is only one strategy profile (B,B) that can be assumed 
to be stable. FCBC still has an infinite number of Nash-equilibria and only one efficient cell, 
but contrary to MFC there is one player (player 1 in table 2) having direct influence on that 
player’s own payoff. The CO game has two pure strategy Nash-equilibria. And MP has only 
one Nash-equilibrium in mixed strategies. As Mitropoulos (2001) reports, in MFC and FCBC 
about 50 percent of the pairs eventually ended up coordinating on the efficient cell, while for 
the CO game coordination on efficiency occurred for about 90 percent of the pairs. In MP, as 
expected, none of the pairs coordinated on any particular cell. Except for the strategic similar-
ity between MFC and FCBC all games show diametrically different characteristics. They led 
to more or less volatility in subject behaviour. For this reason, we may expect certain adaptive 
rules to perform better in some games while others perform best in other games. However, we 
do not refrain from checking on the predictive power of rules for the entire set of data.  
5. The Learning Rules 
We consider twelve different rules that allow for adaptive behaviour based solely on feedback 
about the own payoff. For 9 of the twelve rules we use a parameterised version of the rule and 
estimate two parameters using all observations from players labelled 1. We deliberately chose 
to use two parameters to give each of the learning rules the opportunity to be calibrated to the 
specifics of the data set. The number of parameters is a compromise between the need for de-
grees of freedom which in the past have proven to be useful for a reasonable fit of certain 
learning rules to the data and the lack of such a need for certain other learning rules. We fixed 
the number of parameters to two in order to base the comparison on equal footing and to 
avoid another dimension of comparison on the level of information criteria. The last three de-
cision rules are free of parameters and thus provide benchmarks for comparison. Since the 
experiment did not allow to infer any advantage of one action over the other before play be-
gan, we initialised all learning rules to choose both strategies with equal probability.    14
In the following, for the sake of exposition we use  ( ) ( ) a t i P t p
a
i , , =  denotes the probability of 
action a being chosen by player i at period t, while a and b denote the parameters to be esti-
mated.  
Bush-Mosteller (BM)  
The most prominent early formulation of an adaptive rule that does not need information on 
payoffs or actions of opponents is that by Bush and Mosteller (1955). The basic idea of this 
rule is that an action is played with higher probability in the next period, if the action was 
chosen and resulted in success or if the alternative action was chosen and resulted in failure.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )













































































Mookherjee-Sopher (MS)  
Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) use the same underlying idea but a different parameterisation. 
Instead of using separate parameters for the case of success or failure, the MS scheme param-
eterises the extend of reinforcement separated according to whether a particular action had 
been vindicated or refuted.  























































































Cross (CR)  
The Cross (1973) dynamic is also based on probabilistic reinforcement but uses adjustments 
based on the amount of payoff received.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] A t a t p t
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Börgers-Sarin (BS)  
The model by Börgers and Sarin (1997) adds the consideration of an aspiration level b to the 
determination of choice probabilities.    15
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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p p 1 1  
with the aspiration level evolving according to  




i p b b - + = + 1 1  
The second estimated parameter is the initial aspiration level, i.e.  ( ) 1 i
BS b = a .  
Roth-Erev (RE)  
Instead of using probabilities directly, Roth and Erev (1995) proposed a reinforcement learn-
ing rule based on accumulated propensities:  




i = ￿ + ￿ = + 1 1 p b  
The propensities then determine the choice probabilities:  




















RE u u + = a .  
Variant to Roth-Erev (REL) 
Erev et al. (1999) propose a variant to the RE rule that uses adjustments via approximates to 
average payoffs and payoff variance and uses a logit form for the assessment of choice prob-
abilities. The propensities, thus, evolve according to  
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i  denotes the number of times action a had been played by player i until period t. 
The assessment of probabilities then follows  
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whereby the payoff variability PV is determined via 
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and the approximate for the average payoff PA is given by 














and the initial PA(1) is the expected payoff from random choice and PV(1) is the expected 
absolute difference between the obtained payoff from random choice and the average payoff 
from random choice.  
Karandikar et al. (KA)  
The model proposed by Karandikar et al. (1998) is a halfway conditionally deterministic 
process that bears similarity to the win-stay lose-randomise scheme we present below. The 
KA rule, however, involves an evolving aspiration level. Formally, a simplified version of the 
original model states: 
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whereby the aspiration level is given in the same way as in the BS scheme,  




i p b b + - = + 1 1  
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x
x h  
with g fixed at 0.2 and d fixed at 0.1.  
The second parameter to be estimated is the initial aspiration level, i.e.  ( ) 1 i
KA b = a .  
Experimentation Learning (EX)  
In a slightly different version the experimentation learning scheme has been proposed by Mi-
tropoulos (forthcoming). Again, the idea is to basically play the win-stay lose-randomise 
scheme, but contrary to KA the EX scheme postulates that players record the results of a cer-
tain number of trials for each action. The discrete value of an action a is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )
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1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
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which is initialised with zero, and the choice probabilities are then determined via 










i t v t v t v t v t p a ￿ ￿ - + = , max sign 5 . 0  
Sarin-Vahid (SV) 
The learning rule proposed by Sarin and Vahid (1997) is based on approximates for average 
payoffs of each action  






i „ ￿ + = ￿ + - = + 1 1 1 1 p a a  
which are deranged by a normally distributed variable with zero mean Z, i.e.  




i + = ~  
and then determine the action chosen:  
( )
{ }








The second estimated parameter is the standard deviation of the random variable  Z, i.e. 
( ) Z
SV var = b .  
Win-Stay Lose-Change (WSLC)  
The win-stay lose-change strategy has become famous because in dilemma situations it turned 
out to be an evolutionarily very successful simple adaptation rule (Nowak and Sigmund 
1993). In our setting it also coincides with the more general concept of learning direction the-
ory (Selten and Stoecker 1986, Selten and Buchta 2000). The rule simply postulates 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 = ￿ „ + = ￿ = = + t a t a t a t a t p i i i i
a
i p p  
Win-Stay Lose-Randomise (WSLR)  
As argued by Mitropoulos (2001), for the games considered, a randomisation after receiving 
zero payoff is much more effective in pursuing the efficient cell than is the strict change of 
action. Therefore, we also investigate the rule win-stay lose-randomise, whereby the randomi-
sation is assumed to occur with equal probability over both actions.  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 1 5 . 0 1 1 1 1 = ￿ + = ￿ = = + t t a t a t p i i i
a
i p p  
As can easily be verified, this rule is a special case of the KA scheme.    18
Randomisation (RAND)  
As a representative of complete lack of adaptive ability, the rule that assigns equal probability 
over actions regardless of what happened before will serve as a benchmark.  




It is beyond the scope of this paper to study the method of calibration of learning rules. In the 
following the estimation results will be taken as given, without questioning the validity or the 
robustness. The results on the comparison of different learning rules will, however, give rise 
to discussions about the impact on methods of estimation.  
The calibration of the learning rules was done via a maximum-likelihood estimation on the 
probabilistic one-period ahead predictions for half of the data set. The other half of the data 
set will serve as the base for predictions. Table 3 shows the estimation results for the 9 rules 
that involve parameters. All parameters, except one, turned out to be highly significant 
(p<0.001) according to a Wald-Test. The only parameter not being significantly different 
from 0 (not even to the 10% level) is b
KA, the adjustment parameter for the aspiration level. 
Since the initial aspiration level a
KA is very close to 0.5, the resulting KA scheme is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from WSLR. This similarity is useful for detecting whether measures 
sufficiently discriminate between similar and dissimilar rules.  
Rule  Alpha  Beta  Log-Likelihood  Rank 
BM  0.27  0.12  -4245.53  1 
MS  0.22  0.23  -4338.23  2 
CR  0.18  0.03  -4406.63  3 
BS  0.40  0.06  -4852.49  8 
RE  3.00  0.91  -4446.94  4 
REL  13.76  11.22  -4618.87  7 
KA  0.49  0.00  -8894.75  9 
EX  8.00  0.99  -4489.30  5 
SV  0.13  0.27  -4503.46  6 
Table 3: Estimation Results on the 9 Rules Involving Parameters 
The log-likelihood after calibration already gives a measure of the goodness of fit and allows 
for a comparison between rules. However, as can easily be seen, rules that make almost point 
predictions do have a considerable disadvantage as compared to those rules that make predic-
tions with moderate probabilities, since few predictions close to unit vectors that turn out to 
be false dramatically reduce the likelihood of the observations. Selten (1998) has pointed out 
this over-sensitivity of the log-likelihood measure. We follow him in rejecting this measure as   19
a means to compare different rules with each other and, thus, will not include it in the follow-
ing analysis.  
6. Hypotheses and Results 
6.1 Characteristics of the classical MSD 
Selten (1998) points out the desirable properties of the MSD measure when comparing prob-
abilistic observations with probabilistic predictions. The method MSD(Y,P) is the correspond-
ing measure for the closeness of probabilistic predictions to probabilistic disaggregated 
events. Contrary to this assumption, experimental data usually consist of a number of corre-
lated observations on events that appear to be realisations of dynamically determined random 
variables. As a consequence, one must admit the structural difference between predictions and 
observations
8.  
One way of dealing with this difference is to compare observations with realisations of prob-
abilistic predictions. The corresponding measure is MSD(Y,X). Representing Y, P, and X as 
column vectors one easily calculates the difference between these two measures as 






¢ + - ¢ + =
- = D
P P v P v




where  P Y Y Y v ¢ ￿ - ¢ = 2  and 1 is the vector consisting of ones. More important than the sign of 
D is its dependence on the structure of the probabilities  P. The difference is substantially 
higher if the predictions P mainly contain intermediate values (around 0.5 for individual ac-
tions, or around 0.25 for group outcomes) than if these predictions frequently contain almost 
sure predictions, i.e. many entries close to 0 or close to 1. As a consequence, cautious prob-
abilistic learning rules that mainly predict probabilities around the equal distribution may per-
form well under  MSD(Y,P) but badly under  MSD(Y,X). Table 4 shows the  comparison of 
ranks for each rule over all measures and for the methods MSD(Y,P) and MSD(Y,X). We re-
stricted the table to show only the results for the aggregation level of individual actions Y and 
the data set containing observations from all games.  
Table 4 shows that, indeed, the performance of certain rules varies between MSD(Y,P) and 
MSD(Y,X). Most intriguing is the jump of the rule WSLC within the measure MSD when turn-
ing from probabilistic to simulated predictions. On the other hand, most purely probabilistic 
                                                        
8 The problem that predictions and observations are of different type has been discussed by Bossuyt and Roskam 
(1987) for static probabilistic choice models.    20
rules rank worse when using simulated predictions than when using probabilistic ones. A no-
table exception is the Börgers-Sarin scheme BS.  
 
Actions Y  All games  Rule 
Measure  Method  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MSD  ( ) P Y M ,   2  1  6  3  5  7  8  12  4  11  10  9 
  ( ) X Y M ,   5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
MAD  ( ) P Y M ,   5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
  ( ) X Y M ,   5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
POI  ( ) P Y M ,   5  3  10  1  9  8  7  12  4  11  2  6 
  ( ) X Y M ,   5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
KS  ( ) P Y M ,   7  3  10  1  9  8  6  11,5  4  11,5  2  5 
  ( ) X Y M ,   6  5  10  2  9  8  4  11  7  12  1  3 
Table 4: Comparison of ranks for all rules over all measures and over methods M(Y,P) and M(Y,X),  
restricted to levels of actions Y and values on all games 
As long as we are dealing with bivariate observational data the MAD measure does not suffer 




MAD . The measures POI and KS are not quite as stable, but also show less variance 
between methods than the MSD. As illustrated in subsection 6.5 MAD’s independence of the 
method of comparison is no longer true if we switch to group outcomes as observations; that 
is, to data with more than two possible states.  
Furthermore, if the set of events to be predicted is a finite unordered space, we have 
MSD(Y,X) = MAD(Y,X) = POI(Y,X)
9. This means that the method based on simulations of 
one-period ahead predictions has the advantage of being invariant to whether the MSD, the 
MAD, or the POI measure is being used. And, trivially, this holds even when turning to out-
comes as observational data. But the prime argument in favour of using simulations is that the 
observations are taken as realisations of random variables, which is exactly the way they are 
treated by the probabilistic theories. To the contrary, the M(Y,P) method, implicitly treats ob-
servations as probabilistic events.  
6.2 The MSD versus the KS 
In earlier literature it has been noted that the MSD and the KS differ in the way they treat the 
prediction that consists of a randomisation with uniform distribution over all actions available, 
which in our case is the RAND rule (see e.g. Gandin and Murphy, 1992). While the MSD 
gives some positive value the KS always normalizes the value to 0. For practitioners in ap-
plied fields of research this characteristic of the KS may be a valuable feature. For the testing   21
and comparison of theories, however, what value is given to the RAND rule is not as impor-
tant an issue as its rank compared to other rules.  
Actions Y  Rule RAND  Game 
Method  Measure  MFC  FCBC  CO  MP  all 
MSD  10  10  11  7  11  ( ) P Y M ,  
KS  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5 
MSD  11  11  12  11  11  ( ) X Y M ,  
KS  12  11  12  12  12 
MSD  3  6  11  1  2  ( ) Z Y M ,  
KS  1  6  10  1  2 
MSD  10  5  10  1  9  ( ) Q Y M ,  
KS  12  4    2  1 
MSD  11  11  11  7  11  ( ) P Y M ,  
KS  6.5  11.5    7  11.5 
Table 5: Ranks of the rule RAND for the aggregation level of actions Y 
and for measures MSD and KS 
Table 5 shows all ranks of the RAND rule for the measures MSD and KS over all methods of 
comparison and over all games. We restricted the table to only show ranks for the aggregation 
level of actions Y, because for outcomes we do not have a proper definition of the KS. Note 
that, for the CO game, after aggregating observations over individuals, i.e. Y , and after trans-
forming the relative frequencies into a point decision we were left with the same observation 
over all 40 rounds, so the KS is not well defined. The table shows that there are only few in-
stances of a significant difference in ranks between the MSD and the KS. Whether RAND per-
forms rather well or rather badly depends on the method of comparison as well as the charac-
teristics of the data.  
The three notable exceptions are implicitly or explicitly discussed below when the perform-
ance of rules is investigated for each game separately.  
6.3 Disaggregated data Y versus aggregated data Y  
Research on adaptive behaviour may serve different purposes. While some researchers may 
be interested in explaining and predicting individual play others may be purely interested in 
aggregate numbers. Within our set of methods of comparison there are two pairs of methods 
that basically do the same, the only difference being the level of aggregation. In particular, 
( ) P Y M ,  is the same as  ( ) P Y M ,  on aggregated data, and  ( ) Q Y M ,  is the same as  ( ) Z Y M ,  
on aggregated data. Tables 6 and 7 show these two comparisons on the ranks generated from 
the data of all games. The usage of data on particular games exhibits a similarly large discrep-
ancy in ranks between levels of aggregation of observations.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Except for the normalisation, which however does not affect ranks.    22
 
Actions Y  All games  Rule 
Measure  Method  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MSD  ( ) P Y M ,   2  1  6  3  5  7  8  12  4  11  10  9 
  ( ) P Y M ,   2  1  8  5  9  4  6  12  3  11  10  7 
MAD  ( ) P Y M ,   5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
  ( ) P Y M ,   5  1  8  2  10  4  7  12  3  11  9  6 
POI  ( ) P Y M ,   5  3  10  1  9  8  7  12  4  11  2  6 
  ( ) P Y M ,   3.5  3.5  10.5  7.5  10.5  3.5  3.5  12  3.5  7.5  9  3.5 
KS  ( ) P Y M ,   7  3  10  1  9  8  6  11.5  4  11.5  2  5 
  ( ) P Y M ,   3.5  3.5  9.5  7  9.5  3.5  3.5  11.5  3.5  11.5  8  3.5 
Table 6: Comparison of ranks for all rules over all measures and over methods  ( ) P Y, M and  ( ) P , Y M ,  
restricted to levels of actions Y and values on all game 
 
Actions Y  All Games  Rule 
Measure  Method  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MSD  ( ) Z Y M ,   8  9  2  11  3  6  4  7  12  5  10  1 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   4  5  8  1  7  11  3  10  6  9  12  2 
MAD  ( ) Z Y M ,   8  9  2  11  3  6  4  7  12  5  10  1 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   4  5  9  1  7  11  3  10  6  8  12  2 
POI  ( ) Z Y M ,   8  9  2  11  3  6  4  7  12  5  10  1 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   6  9.5  11  6  8  6  2.5  9.5  2.5  12  2.5  2.5 
KS  ( ) Z Y M ,   10  4  7  9  5  3  8  1  6  2  12  11 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   8  6  12  8  10  8  3.5  11  3.5  1  3.5  3.5 
Table 7: Comparison of ranks for all rules over all measures and over methods  ( ) Z Y, M  and  ( ) Q , Y M ,  
restricted to levels of actions Y and values on all games 
The tables show considerable differences in rankings dependent on whether before calculation 
data were aggregated over players or not. This is true for both comparisons of methods and is 
independent of the measure used.  
We first discuss the comparison between M(Y,P) and  ( ) P Y M ,  from table 6. As noted in sec-
tion 6.1 the M(Y,P) method treats observations on pure strategy choices the same as probabil-
istic predictions. Taking the mean of all observations for each period over all players, thus, 
transforms data into observations of approximates on choice probabilities for a representative 
agent. As a result, the method  ( ) P Y M ,  can be viewed as the comparison between observed 
and predicted choice probabilities of a representative agent who is composed from agents with 
diverse histories. By aggregation, hence, the method regains internal consistency. The conse-
quence for the rankings depends on the measure used. Since MSD punishes large deviations 
stronger than small deviations, rules making point predictions suffer a disadvantage under 
disaggregated data as compared to the application of the MSD after aggregation (REL, KA,   23
WSLR). Conversely, rules that regularly predict probability distributions rather close to uni-
formity tend to perform worse after aggregation (CR, BS, RE). This observation is not true for 
the measure MAD, since MAD treats large deviations proportionally to small deviations. Still, 
there are differences in ranks between disaggregated data and aggregated data. Correlation 
coefficients for each measure on the ranks from the two methods even reveal that the MSD 
produces fewer differences (r = 0.85) than MAD, POI, or the KS (0.43, 0.45, 0.57, respec-
tively).  
Discrepancies in rankings between aggregation over players are more pronounced for the 
comparison between methods  ( ) Z Y M ,  and  ( ) Q Y M ,  which are based on complete simula-
tions of 40-round play. Correlation coefficients on the differences in rankings between meth-
ods reveal that after aggregation the order of rules is significantly affected (rMSD = 0.03, rMAD 
= 0.01, rPOI = -0.23, rKS = -0.22). This finding is confirmed when looking at the correspond-
ing figures for specific games. As an example, table 8 shows this comparison of methods for 
the MSD measure and for each game separately. Note that for  ( ) Z Y M ,  and  ( ) Q Y M ,  the 
measures MSD and MAD produce the same rankings. The according correlation coefficients 
between methods vary a lot (rMFC = -0.41, rFCBC = 0.81, rCO = 0.46, rMP = 0.08) with the 
worst correlation between ranks for the game MFC.  
Actions Y  MSD  Rule 
Game  Method  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MFC  ( ) Z Y M ,   9  11  3  10  5  6  4  8  12  7  1  2 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   3  2  7  11  6  9  4  8  1  10  12  5 
FCBC  ( ) Z Y M ,   8  9  2  10  3  4  7  6  12  5  11  1 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   9  10  4  12  3  7  2  6  11  5  8  1 
CO  ( ) Z Y M ,   8  9  2  11  3  6  4  7  12  5  10  1 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   5  9  1  11  2  3  6  8  4  10  12  7 
MP  ( ) Z Y M ,   7  10  6  2  8  5  11  9  3  4  12  1 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   7  9  5  12  4  6  3  8  11  1  10  2 
Table 8: Comparison of ranks over all rules, over methods  ( ) Z Y, M  and  ( ) Q , Y M , and  
over all games restricted to levels of actions Y and the measure MSD  
Note that for the game CO the method  ( ) Z Y M ,  is not really meaningful, since observations 
are distributed in a bimodal way. Most often pairs eventually coordinated on either (A,A) or 
(B,B) with both outcomes being almost equally likely. Simulated players, hence, cannot cap-
ture the trend towards a particular action of an individual over time. This deficiency is elimi-
nated when using the according method on aggregated data, i.e.  ( ) Q Y M , , since both observa-
tions as well as predictions are formulated independently of individuals.    24
Returning to tables 6 and 7 we also note that POI and KS are better not used on aggregated 
data because they do not sufficiently discriminate among rules. In our case, after aggregation 
there are only 40 data points left for comparison. Since aggregated data as well as aggregated 
predictions are internally highly correlated, these measures by transforming into point predic-
tions and pure strategy observations eliminate too much information.  
6.4 One-period ahead predictions P versus complete simulations  Z , Q  
When forecasting economic indicators or indices from stock markets it naturally is an impor-
tant issue for which time horizon predictions are formed. Apart from seasonal influences that 
have to be taken into account, there is a trade-off between the size of the prediction period and 
accuracy. When experimentalists use models of adaptive decision making then the same deci-
sion upon the size of the prediction interval involves more methodological considerations. 
While forecasting stocks and bonds or economic indicators serve the sole purpose of making 
the optimal decision on investment or policy, experimental economics has an additional inter-
est in finding a good model of the underlying cognitive processes. As a consequence, different 
methods of evaluation may serve different aspects of research in learning. If models are sup-
posed to fit as closely as possible to the actual process of decision making of subjects, then it 
is best to compare the performance of a decision rule by measuring its efficacy in predicting 
the immediately following decision, given the history of decisions before. This is represented 
by our set of one-period ahead predictions P. The design of market institutions, however, re-
quires the anticipation of general dynamic trends. This is better captured by predictions of 
long sequences of dynamic play. For this purpose we chose to also simulate complete 40-
round sequences of repeated play with artificial agents. We denote one such sequence as  Z  
and the average of a number of such sequences as Q .  
We, first, stay at the disaggregated level of data and look at the difference in ranks among 
rules between using realisations of the probabilistic predictions  ( ) X Y M ,  and the completely 
simulated predictions  ( ) Z Y M , . Table 9 shows the corresponding figures.  
Note, first, that for simulated disaggregated data the MSD produces the same ranks as MAD 
and the POI. Note further that for the reasons mentioned in the preceding subsection we do 
not present figures for the game CO.  
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Actions Y  MSD  Rule 
Game  Method  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MFC  ( ) X Y M ,   5  6  9  1  7  10  4  12  8  11  3  2 
  ( ) Z Y M ,   9  11  3  10  5  6  4  8  12  7  1  2 
FCBC  ( ) X Y M ,   5  6  7  4  8  10  2  12  9  11  1  3 
  ( ) Z Y M ,   8  9  2  10  3  4  7  6  12  5  11  1 
MP  ( ) X Y M ,   7  5  10  2  9  8  4  12  6  11  1  3 
  ( ) Z Y M ,   7  10  6  2  8  5  11  9  3  4  12  1 
Table 9: Comparison of ranks over all rules, over methods  ( ) X Y, M  and  ( ) Z Y, M , and  
for each game separately restricted to levels of actions Y and the measure MSD  
It is fairly obvious that the method employed has a larger impact on the rank of a rule than the 
game. Most striking is the good performance of the simple model WSLC over all games, if 
one-period ahead predictions are considered. For the game MFC performance stays good even 
when turning to simulated predictions. But for the other games WSLC rather badly predicts 
the long-run trend of pairs. To the contrary, the more appropriate rule WSLR performs well 
independent of the game and independent of the way predictions are being generated. A fur-
ther striking observation concerns the rule RAND. The bad performance of the purely ran-
domising decision rule when predicting individual decisions had to be expected. Also, no sur-
prise causes the good performance of RAND for the game MP, since, by the dynamics of the 
game, subjects can be expected to be driven to randomising behaviour. However, the interme-
diate ranks for the two other games show that more sophisticated rules have difficulties in 
capturing coordination by pairs.  
We now have a look at the same figures for the comparison of rules based on aggregated data. 
Table 10 shows the ranks of rules once for the comparison between aggregate one-period 
ahead predictions and aggregated data, i.e.  ( ) P Y M , , and once for the comparison between 
completely simulated predictions and aggregated data,  ( ) Q Y M , .  
Actions Y  MSD  Rule 
Game  Method  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MFC  ( ) P Y M ,   5  3  7  1  10  8  2  12  6  11  9  4 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   3  2  7  11  6  9  4  8  1  10  12  5 
FCBC  ( ) P Y M ,   5  2  9  1  10  8  3  12  6  11  7  4 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   9  10  4  12  3  7  2  6  11  5  8  1 
MP  ( ) P Y M ,   2  1  6  4  5  10  8  12  3  7  11  9 
  ( ) Q Y M ,   7  9  5  12  4  6  3  8  11  1  10  2 
Table 10: Comparison of ranks over all rules, over methods  ( ) P , Y M  and  ( ) Q , Y M , and  
for each game separately restricted to levels of actions Y and the measure MSD    26
Comparing tables 9 and 10 with each other we see that after turning to aggregated data the 
rules that require little sophistication do not perform as extreme as for the disaggregated data. 
For one-period ahead predictions of aggregated data the BS rule performs particularly well. 
However, the same rule performs worst when turning to complete simulations. It appears that 
data on the MFC game produce less differences in ranks (rMFC = 0.38) than the data for the 
other two games for which correlations of ranks even tend to be negative (rFCBC = -0.34, rMFC 
= -0.27). We, hence, find that when looking at aggregated data, the incentives of the games 
are as important a factor for the ranks as is the way predictions are generated.  
6.5 Individual actions Y  versus group outcomes 
O Y  
Up to now, in order to assess the predictive power of a learning rule we always used individ-
ual actions as the underlying observations. This is in line with general practice in experimen-
tal learning literature. However, without loss of information we may also use the group out-
come as the observed variable. Similar to the comparison of methods  ( ) P Y M ,  and  ( ) X Y M ,  
from section 6.1 we get that the  ( )
O O O P Y MSD ,  as compared to  ( )
O O O X Y MSD ,  favours pre-
dictions close to uniform distributions over predictions close to unit vectors. We have seen 
that the MAD measure did not discriminate between probabilistic rules and learning rules that 
make point predictions as long as the expected number of hits is the same. However, MAD 
suffers from the same deficiency as the MSD measure when turning to outcomes as observa-
tional data. That is,  ( )
O O O P Y MAD ,  will favour probabilistic over point predicting rules as 
compared to the usage of simulations, i.e.  ( )
O O O X Y MAD , . A set of stylised data illustrates 
this point. We use the simplest possible observation, namely that both players use the same 
action (action 1) over all four periods. Observations and predictions are displayed in Table 11.  
      Prediction       
  Observation 




Period  Player 1  Player 2  Player 1  Player 2  Player 1  Player 2 
1  1  1  0  1  0.5  0.5 
2  1  1  1  0  0.5  0.5 
3  1  1  0  1  0.5  0.5 
4  1  1  1  0  0.5  0.5 
Table 11: Exemplary data for observations, point predictions and probabilistic predictions 
The resulting values for the two rules over aggregation levels and over measures for the 
method M(Y,P) are depicted in table 12.    27
 
    Rule 
Measure  Aggregation 




MSD  Actions  0.707  0.500 
  Outcomes  0.707  0.433 
MAD  Actions  0.500  0.500 
  Outcomes  0.500  0.375 
Table 12: Values of predictive power for the exemplary data 
The result is that among those learning rules that produce the same number of correct predic-
tions on group outcomes the MSD(Y,P) favours those that make predictions close to the uni-
form distribution. It does even more so when using the observational level of group outcomes 
rather than individual actions. Differently, MAD(Y,P) does not discriminate between types of 
rules as long as we deal with individual actions as observations. However, probabilistic rules 
perform better when applied to the group outcomes. The intuition behind it is that on the level 
of outcomes the probabilistic prediction scatters probability mass over several possible out-
comes and thus reduces the expected penalty of a wrong prediction.  
Table 13 shows the corresponding values for the actual data. It is plain to see that the above 
result for extreme learning rules and extreme data does not carry over to the analysis of our 
data. The method and the measure do have a larger impact on rankings than whether we use 
individual actions or group outcomes.  
All games      Rule 
Measure  Method  Aggregation  BM  MS  CR  BS  RE  REL  KA  EX  SV  RAND  WSLC  WSLR 
MSD  Actions  2  1  6  3  5  7  8  12  4  11  10  9 
 
( ) P Y M ,  
Outcomes  1  2  4  5  6  7  8  12  3  10  11  9 
  Actions  5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
 
( ) X Y M ,  
Outcomes  5  6  7  4  8  10  3  11  9  12  1  2 
MAD  Actions  5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
 
( ) P Y M ,  
Outcomes  5  6  7  4  8  10  3  12  9  11  1  2 
  Actions  5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
 
( ) X Y M ,  
Outcomes  5  6  7  4  8  10  3  11  9  12  1  2 
POI  Actions  5  3  10  1  9  8  7  12  4  11  2  6 
 
( ) P Y M ,  
Outcomes  5  3  10  1  9  7  8  11  4  12  2  6 
  Actions  5  6  9  2  8  10  4  12  7  11  1  3 
 
( ) X Y M ,  
Outcomes  5  6  7  4  8  10  3  11  9  12  1  2 
Table 13: Comparison of ranks over all rules, over methods  ( ) P Y, M  and  ( ) X Y, M ,  
over measures MSD, MAD and POI and over aggregation levels,  
restricted to data from all games 
Still, the problems described above again lead us to support the usage of simulated predic-
tions, which do not suffer from similar problems of inconsistency. We suspect, that the impact 
of the representation of the data as actions or outcomes rises as the number of group members   28
rises and as the number of alternative actions rises, since this would quickly lead to outcome 
spaces that are much larger and allow probabilistic rules to scatter probability mass even 
more.  
7. Discussion 
This work was devoted to eliciting the impact of the choice of the method of comparison on 
the resulting ranking between learning rules. We found that the choice of method has a large 
impact on the ranking. The paper helps to clarify the characteristics of the various methods of 
evaluation and offers ways how to produce robust results. Where methods differ from each 
other in fundamental ways we argue that each method may be conceived of serving different 
purposes. Furthermore, we find some applications in earlier literature to suffer from lack of 
consistency. As a result, we suggest that future research on learning should be more sensitive 
to methodological issues. Either researchers support their choice of method of comparison by 
arguments related to the purpose of their study, or they support the robustness of their results 
by checking on a wide range of alternative methods.  
In particular we find that the popular MSD measure suffers from some deficiencies and should 
better not be used in conjunction with a comparison between observational data on individual 
actions and probabilistic predictions. The classical way around this problem is to use meas-
ures that transform probabilistic predictions into point predictions by using a cut-off predic-
tion probability (in our case 0.5). This is done in the POI and KS measures. This procedure, 
however, is accompanied by a severe loss of information. Instead, we suggest to use simula-
tions of probabilistic predictions. So, a mean of measures of predictive power between actual 
observations and simulated predictions can be calculated.  
We further find that the method of comparison is crucial for the resulting ranking between 
rules. It does matter whether one uses disaggregated data or mean values averaged over indi-
viduals. It also does matter whether one chooses one-period ahead predictions or complete 
simulations of play. Experimentalists analysing their data may justify their decision on these 
two dimensions by pointing at their research purpose. Disaggregated data and one-period 
ahead predictions are better suited for studying individual cognitive processes, while aggre-
gated data and long-run predictions better elicit the ability of forecasting general d ynamic 
trends. In any case the purpose of the study should be made clear.  
For our data, which are generated by repeated interaction of groups consisting of only two 
players, the question of whether predictions are made for individual actions or for group out-
comes seems not to matter much. However, the analysis on exemplary data shows that its im-  29
portance may be expected to rise when groups consist of more players. Another crucial factor 
for the comparison of learning rules is the question whether to predict aggregated data or in-
dividual data. Some measures perform better in the former task while others are better in the 
latter.  
The scope of this work is not limited to repeated games. The insights gained into the use of 
measures for the predictive power of dynamic theories carry over to the literature on econo-
metrics and meteorological forecasting. Considering that measures may as well be used for 
estimation purposes our conclusion is that the estimation of learning theories of the kind used 
in this study involves a lot of sensitivity towards the employed method of estimation. For ex-
ample, the maximum-likelihood estimation procedure has long been criticised (see  e.g. 
Friedman 1983). Modern econometric approaches further investigate the variance of predic-
tions based on the variance of parameter estimations given the probabilistic nature of the ob-
servations. The usual approach is to use bootstrapping techniques, such as for example in Pas-
cual et al. (2001). At this stage, due to the large number of candidates as methods of evalua-
tion and the large number of learning rules we deem it not promising to follow this approach 
in the present study.  
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